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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DECISIONS OF TIlE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSIONt
By A. M.
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(a) In General.-The amendment of the interstate conwnrce
act on June 29, 1906,1 already referred to,8 2 provides that in
cases where the interstate commerce commission shall find that
a party is entitled to an award of *damages, the commission shall
make an order directing the defendant to pay the complainant
the sum to which he is entitled. If the order is not obeyed, suit
may be brought in the courts, and such suits shall proceed in all
respects like other civil suits for damages, except that on the trial
the findings and order of the commission shall be prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated.
*Professor of Law, Drake University Law School, Des Moines, Iowa.
first installment see, 11 MINNESOTA LAw RZviEw 389. Ed.
tFor
S1 1n addition to a slight amendment of March 2, 1889, not material
here, section 16 of the interstate commerce act was amended as follows:
Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. at L. 584, 590; Mann-Elkins Act
of June 18, 1910, 36 Stat. at L. 539, and by act of February 28, 1920, 41
Stat. at L. 451, 491, 492.
But the amendments since 1906 (lid not alter the provisions of tile
amendment adopted in 1906 regarding the weight of evidence given to the
findings of the interstate commerce commission. Section 16 as amended
reads in part as follows:
"That if, after hearing on a complaint made as provided in section 13
of this act, the commission shall determine that any party complainant
is entitled to an award of damages under the provisions of this act for
a violation thereof, the commission shall make an order directing the
carrier to pay to the complainant the sum to which he is entitled on or
before a day named. If a carrier (toes not comply with an order for
the payment of money within the time limit in such order, the complainant,
or any person for whose benefit such order was made, may file in the
circuit court of the United States for the district in which lie resides or
in which is located the principal operating office of the carrier, or through
which the road of the carrier runs, or in any state court of general jurisdiction having jurisdiction of the parties, a petition setting forth briefly
the causes for which he claims damages, and the order of the commission
in the premises. Such suit in the circuit court of the United States shall
proceed in all respects like other civil stits for damages, except that on
the trial of such suit the findings and order of the commassion shall be
prima2 facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
8 Page 414 supra.
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This section as amended also provides that if any carrier
fails or neglects to obey any order of the commission other than
for the payment of money, any party injured thereby, or the commission in its own name, may apply to the circuit court for an
enforcement of such order. But in the latter case nothing is
stated as to the weight to be given to the findings of the commission.
The courts have interpreted the provision regarding prima
facie evidence of facts in cases involving reparation or award as
words of limitation. That is, the weight to be given to the findings of the commission in these cases has been limited to that
of prima facie evidence of the facts stated, according to the
provision of the statute, whereas in other cases the value or the
weight attributed to the findings of the commission has not been
so limited. As to the additional weight to be given to findings in
other cases, such as rates, discrimination cases, etc., the courts
have held that this is a question for the discretion of the courts,
but that the import of the interstate commerce act is that more
weight shall be attributed to the findings of the commission in
non-reparation cases.
The result of the amendment of 1906, as is evidenced by an
examination of adjudicated cases, shows that the courts have applied the provision of the amendment according to the clear and
unmistakable terminology of the section so far as reparation
cases are concerned. In such cases the findings and orders of
the commission are regarded as prima facie evidence in actions
before the courts. This, however, does not mean that the findings and orders of the commission in reparation cases are given
the identical consideration which was generally attributed to the
orders of the commission under the act of 1887. That act, as we
have seen,8 3 provides that if a carrier, subject to the act, violates
an order of the commission, the commission or someone interested
may apply to a circuit court and on a hearing before such court
the report of the commission shall be prima facie evidence of the
matters therein stated.
In spite of the similarity in the provisions of the two statutes."
the courts have given more weight to the findings of the commission, even in reparation cases, than they did shortly after tile
83
8 4See

pp. 409-10 supra.
Provisions of the act of 1887 pertained to the decisions of the commission both in reparation and in non-reparation cases, whereas the provisions in the amendment of 1906 applied to the findings and orders of the
commission only in reparation cases.
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commission was established. That is, to begin with, the provision in the act of 1887 regarding 'prima facie evidence was
given less consideration than after the commission had proved
its efficiency and after the cases before the commission and before the courts had become more numerous. After the commission had been in existence for some fifteen or twenty years, and
especially after the amendment of 1906, the courts have generally
iefused to set aside its findings, even in reparation cases, unless
there were some real reasons for so doing, as for instanc e where
the evidence against the prima facie presumption as to the correctness of the findings were sufficiently great to make it quite
clear that there must have been some error in the decision of the
commission.
In regard to non-reparation cases, as will be seen later, 85 the
courts, as stated, have exercised the privilege or possibly the
duty, given them by the interstate commerce act, of attributing
more weight to the decisions of the commission in these cases
than was attributed to the decisions of the commission in such
cases during the early period of the existence of the commission.
And after 1906 they have given much more weight to the findings
of the commission in non-reparation cases than in the reparation cases. On this point the Supreme Court has said that originally the duty of the courts to determine whether an order of
the commission should or should not be enforced carried with it
the obligation to consider both the facts and the law. Later,
according to the court, it came to pass8 that in considering the
subject of orders of the commission, for their enforcement, the
courts were confined by statutory operation to determining
whether there had been violations of the constitution, a want of
conformity to statutory authority, and to ascertaining whether
power had been so arbitrarily exercised as virtually to transcend
the authority conferred.87
(b) Reparation Cases.-A few leading cases decided by the
Supreme Court since 1906 illustrate the attitude of the courts to85

Section VIII of this article, infra.
8oPrior to the passage of the act of 1910 creating the commerce
court.
87Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States, (1912) 225 U. S. 282, 32
Sup. Ct. 761, 56 L. Ed. 1091.
It should be kept in mind, however, that although there is no provision in the interstate commerce act prescribing the weight to be attributed
by the courts to the findings of the commission in non-reparation cases,
yet the import of the act, as well as provisions of the judiciary act as
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ward the amendment of that year in the reparation cases. In
Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co.,S8 the plaintiff sought to recover
damages sustained by reason of the carrier's overcharges and unjust discrimination. The commission found in favor of the
plaintiff and this was affirmed in the district court but reversed
in the circuit court of appeals. At the trial the plaintiff offered
in evidence the reports and orders of the commission and asked
that the facts stated therein be taken as prima facie true. This
was allowed by the lower court and the Supreme Court refused
to consider an objection to its admissibility. Regarding the
weight to be given to such findings the Supreme Court said that"The plain import of the findings is that the amounts awarded
represent the claimant's actual pecuniary loss; and, in view of
the recital that the findings were based upon the evidence adduced,
it must be presumed, there being no showing to the contrary, that
they were justified by it."
To the defendant's claim that the amended section was unconstitutional, the court said:
"This provision only establishes a rebuttable presumption.
It cuts off no defense, interposes no obstacle to a full contestation of all the issues, and takes no question of fact from either
court or jury. At most, therefore, it is merely a rule of evidence."
The same conclusion regarding the weight of the commission's
finding was reached in the so-called second Meeker case" where
the court held that the presence of irrelevant matter in the report
of the commission was harmless error where the case, made by
the evidence rightly admitted, was such as in the absence of any
opposing evidence entitled the shipper to a verdict for the amount
claimed.
Likewise, in New York, etc., Ry. Co. v. Ballou & I&'right,
the finding of the commission that the rate charged to the petitioner was unreasonable and that he was damaged to an amount
stated, was held to be prima facie correct. In Vicksburg. S.
& P. Ry. Co. v. Anderson-Tully Co.," it was held that in a suit
to enforce an award of damages made to a shipper by the commission the introduction in evidence of the findings and order of
amended, undoubtedly is that the findings of the commission on questions
of fact, shall be conclusive in non-reparation cases.
88(1915) 236 U. S. 412, 35 Sup. Ct. 328, 59 L Ed. 644.

s9Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., (1915) 236 U. S. 434, 35 Sup.

Ct. 336, 59 L. Ed. 659.

90(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1917) 242 Fed. 862.
91(C.C.A. 1919) 261 Fed. 741, affirmed in (1921) 256 U. S. 408. 41

Sup. Ct 524, 65 L. Ed. 1020.
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the commission was sufficient to entitle the applicant to judgment
in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.
In Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Minds 2 a warrant by the commission in favor of a shipper on account of discrimination in
furnishing cars was held to be only prima facie evidence of the
amount of damages, and as such it was held that in an action for
the damages that question could be litigated. These cases together with Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Weber,9 3 Mills v. Lehigh Valley R. Co." and Spiller 7,. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. CoY9 established the principle that in the reparation cases the findings and
orders of the interstate commerce commission under the act as
amended are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
The Spiller Case, however, shows an inclination on part of the
court to give even a greater weight to the findings of the commission and shows reluctance to review such findings even in reparation cases as long as such findings are based on evidence. This
is true even if part of the evidence is hearsay. On this point,
and especially in answer to the contention that certain evidence
had been admitted which should have been excluded, the court
said:
"If we were called upon to review the proceeding as upon
a writ of error or appeal, it might be difficult to say that no improper evidence was admitted, that production of the best available was insisted upon, or that a different conclusion might not
have been reached upon that which was admitted. But the scope
of judicial review is not so extensive. .

.

. We are not here

called upon to consider whether the commission may receive and
act upon hearsay evidence seasonably objected to as hearsay; but
we do hold that in this case, where such evidence was introduced
without objection and was substantially corroborated by original
evidence clearly admissible against the parties to be affected, the
commission is not to be regarded as having acted arbitrarily, nor
may its findings and order be rejected as wanting in support,
simply because the hearsay evidence was considered with the
rest."
In referring to the provision of the commerce act that the
commission may conduct its proceedings in such manner as will
best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and to the ends
of justice, as well as to other provisions of the act, the court
said:
92(1919) 250 U.
93(1921) 257 U.
94(1915) 238 U.
95(1920) 253 U.

S. 368, 39 Sup. Ct. 531, 63 L. Ed. 1039.
S. 85, 42 Sup. Ct. 18, 66 L. Ed. 141.
S. 473, 35 Sup. Ct. 888, 59 L. Ed. 1414.
S. 117, 40 Sup. Ct. 466, 64 L. Ed. 810.
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"'These provisions allow a large degree of latitude in the investigation of claims for reparation, and the resulting findings and order
of the commission may not be rejected as evidence because of
any errors in its procedure not amounting to a denial of the right
to a fair hearing, so long as the essential facts found are based
upon substantial evidence."
Likewise, in the case of Pennsylvania R. Co. v. IHVeber," the
fact that the commission improperly used a wrong basis in making an order for reparation, on account of unjust discrimination
in the distribution of coal cars to shippers, was held not to be
prejudicial error, where there was testimony tending to -show
damages in at least the sum awarded by the commissionY
(c) Evidential and Ultimate Facts.-It is worthy of note that
the provision in the statute that the findings of the commission
shall be prima facie evidence does not apply to evidential facts
but to ultimate facts found by the commission. Thus in repara"tion cases, questions whether there has been injury, and if so
to what extent, are ultimate questions and the findings on such
questions are prima facie evidence in the courts. But questions
preliminary to these and which are administrative in character,
such as reasonableness of rates, are evidential facts and such
findings, with some exceptions noted later and chiefly as to questions of law, are conclusive and will not be reviewed by the
courts even where such questions arise in reparation casesY
As such, even in reparation cases, there are a number of preliminary questions that the courts will not consider unless there
are clear or unmistakable errors on the part of the commission.
Thus, for instance, the courts will not pass upon the qualifications
of witnesses to give expert testimony. In this connection the
Supreme Court said:
"Whether he had shown such special knowledge as to qualify
him to testify as an expert was for the interstate commerce commission to determine; and its decision thereon is not to be set
aside by the courts unless clearly shown to have been unfounded." 99
96(1921) 257 U. S. 85, 42 Sup. Ct. 18, 66 L. Ed. 141.
9
7See also Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Jacoby & Co., (1916) 242 U. S. 89,
37 Sup. Ct. 49, 61 L. Ed. 165.
98
Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., (1915) 236 U. S. 412, 35 Sup. Ct.
328, 59 L. Ed. 644; Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., (1915) 236 U. S.
434, 35 Sup. Ct. 336, 59 L. Ed. 659; Mills v. Lehigh Valley R. Co.,
(1915) 238 U. S. 473, 35 Sup. Ct. 888, 59 L. Ed. 1414; Spiller v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. R. Co., (1920) 253 U. S. 117, 40 Sup. C. 466, 64 L. Ed. 810.
99Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., (1920) 253 U. S. 117, 40
Sup. Ct. 466, 64 L. Ed. 810.
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VIII.

FINALITY OF THE DECISIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION IN

NON-REPARATION

CASES

In taking up the problem as to how far the courts will review

the findings of the interstate commerce commission in non-reparation cases, we find, as already noted, that much greater weight
will be given to these, and we note that in such cases the findings of fact by the commission are conclusive, with some ex-

ceptions.
It is especially when we consider the non-reparation cases
that we realize that the federal courts, and especially the Supreme
Court, by their interpretation of the interstate commerce act
and otherwise, have in a number of caseslob established a category of administrative questions. When such administrative
questions are involved, the courts will not only refuse to act,
except where immediate action is necessary, but will also, whenever they deem it possible, refuse to substitute their judgment
for that of the commission.
In the first place we note that the findings of the commission
as to whether a certain rate is reasonable and whether or not
rules pertaining to rates results in preferences and discriniinations, are conclusive upon the courts. In I. C. C. v. Delawarc L.
& W. R. Co. 1' 0 the court said in this connection:
"The finding of the commission that to permit the enforcement of the rule would give rise to preferences and engender discriminations prohibited by the act to regulate commerce embodies
a conclusion of fact beyond our competency to re-examine."
It is, of course, even more evident that the courts will not
examine the facts on which the commission based its order affecting rates so long as the commission acted within its authority
and so long as the conclusions reached by the commission and
its order are based on evidence. 3
10OThe outstanding cases in this connection are: Texas & P. R. Co.
v. Abilene Cotton 0. Co., (1907) 204 U. S. 426, 27 Sup. Ct. 350, 51 L. Ed.
553; Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. U. S. cx rel. Pitcairn C. Co., (1910) 215
U. S. 481, 30 Sup. Ct. 164, 54 L. Ed. 292; Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (1913) 230 U. S. 304, 33 Sup. Ct. 938, 57 L. Ed. 1494;
Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Solum, (1918) 247 U. S. 477, 38 Sup. Ct. 550,
62 L. Ed. 1221; Director General of R. v. Viscore Co., (1921) 254 U. S.
498, 41 Sup. Ct. 151, 65 L. Ed. 372; Great Northern R. Co. v. Merchants
Elevator Co., (1922) 259 U. S. 285, 42 Sup. Ct. 477, 66 L. Ed. 943.
102(1911) 220 U. S. 235, 31 Sup. Ct. 392, 55 L. Ed. 448. See also
Hooker v. Knapp, (1912) 225 U. S. 302, 32 Sup. Ct. 769, 56 L Ed. 1099.
1°0I. C. C. v. Union P. R. Co., (1912) 222 U. S. 541, 32 Sup. Ct. 108,
56 L. Ed. 308.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF I. C. C. DECISIONS

In I. C. C. v." Union P. R. Co., 04 where an order of the commission reducing rates was involved, the court calls attention to
the fact that the statute makes the findings of the commission
prima facie correct, and shows the tendency on the part of the
courts to interpret this to mean that the order of the commission
is final unless made without authority or based upon a mistake
of law.
The courts have likewise no authority to review an order of
the commission establishing rates for pre-cooling cars for interstate shipments of fruits. 0 5 In this connection we note that what
is a proper rate on fruit in pre-cooling shipments, and a fair
charge for hauling necessary ice and rendering other transportation services, are all rate-making matters committed to the commission. As such that body may determine what shall be the
difference in rate between carload and less than carload lots.
It may also decide whether the difference in revenue, due to a
difference in method of loading, warrants a difference in the rate
on carload shipments of the same article. 00 The interstate commerce commission may furthermore prescribe the form in which
schedules shall be prepared and arranged and may approve tariffs
stating that the single rate includes both the line haul and accessorial services absorbed in the rate. On the subject of through
rate, it may prescribe a tariff fixing a through rate which includes
not only the haul of the fruit, but the haul of the ice necessary
to keep the fruit in condition. 07
. "All these are matters committed to the decision of the administrative body, which, in each instance, is required to fix reasonable rates and establish reasonable practices. The courts have
not been vested with any such power. They cannot make rates.
They cannot interfere with rates fixed or practices established
by the commission 0unless
it is made plainly to appear that those
8
ordered are void."1

Also, an order by the commission restoring an old local rate
which had been raised by the carrier, will not be set aside or
reviewed by the court when supported by substantial although
conflicting evidence;'09 and a finding that a rate or fare imposed
1O4Ibid.
1osAtchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States, (1914) 232 U. S.
199, 34 Sup. Ct. 291, 58 L. Ed. 568.
lOGIbid.
lOIbid.
'osIbid. See also I. C. C. v. Union P. R. Co., (1912) 22 U. S. 541,
32 Sup. Ct. 108, 56 L. Ed. 308.
1091. C. C. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., (1913) 227 U. S.88, 33 Sup. Ct.
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by state authority or intrastate commerce causes undue, unreasonable, and unjust discrimination against interstate and foreign
commerce is binding on the courts if there is sufficient evidence to
support it."' Equally conclusive is a finding that a railroad is
engaged in interstate commerce and subject to the jurisdiction
of the commission.' 1
The weight given to the commission's findings of fact in
cases involving the question whether a railroad may make a
greater charge for a short than for a long haul was discussed by
the court in United States v. Louisville & N. R. Co.,"' in which
it was held that the amendment in 1910 to section four of the
act of 1887 takes from the carrier and primarily vests in the commission power to determine the existence of conditions justifying
a greater charge for a short than for a long haul, and such determination by the commission is final.
An order of the commission will not be reviewed where it
was based upon a determination that existing rates subjected
shippers from a certain point to undue prejudice. Such order
is conclusive in an action to enjoin enforcement of an order requiring railroads to cease discrimination." 3 Likewise, where the
evidence was ample to support an order of the commission dividing joint rates between carriers, the court will not consider the
11 4
weight of the evidence or the wisdom of the order made.
On the subject of railroad cars we note that the interstate
commerce act confers power on the commission to regulate the
distribution of cars,"' and its jurisdiction over the subject is
exclusive." 6 As such the courts will not under the guise of
185, 57 L. Ed. 431; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. United States, (1918)

U. S. 463, 38 Sup. Ct. 141, 62 L. Ed. 400.

245

ii°Illinois C. R. Co. v. Railroad Co. of Ky., (D.C. Ken. 1924) 1 F.
(2d) 805; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Public S. C., (D.C. N.Y. 1921) 272
Fed. 758.
"'City of New York v. United States, (D.C. N.Y. 1921) 272 Fed.
768.
"12(1914) 235 U. S. 314, 35 Sup. Ct. 113, 59 L. Ed. 245.
"'3United States v. Illinois C. R. Co., (1924) 263 U. S. 515, 44 Sup.
Ct. 189,
68 L. Ed. 417.
1 4 Akron, C. & Y. Ry. Co. v. United States, (1923) 262 U. S. 184,
43 Sup. Ct. 270, 67 L. Ed. 605. The case of Finkbine Lumber Co. v.
Gulf & S. I. R. Co., (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1920) 269 Fed. 933 (certiorari denied, 41 Sup. Ct. 377) shows that an order by the commission as to
switching charges is conclusive.
"'5See section 15, (1), (3), (4), (6), (10), (11), (12), (14), and
section6 3, (1) ; U. S. Comp. Stat. sees. 8563, 8565, 8583.
"1 United States v. New River Co., (1924) 265 U. S. 533, 44 Sup. Ct.
610, 68 L. Ed. 1165; I. C. C. v. Union P. R. Co., (1912) 222 U. S. 541,
32 Sup. Ct. 108, 56 L. Ed. 308; Kansas City So. R. Co. v. United States,
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exerting judicial powtr, usurp merely administrative functions by
setting aside an order of the commission within the scope of the
power delegated to it upon the ground that such power was unwisely or inexpediently exercised.11
Also, where the commission
has determined that an emergency existed, and has suspended a
rule prescribing the distribution of cars among coal mines, the
court will not annul the order on the ground that the power conferred upon the commission was unwisely or improvidently exercised.1"
The regulation of the commission that all cars having sides
more than thirty-six inches in height must be equipped with side
ladders is final, and not subject to review or change by the
courts. 1 9 However. a finding that a carrier has held itself out
to carry oil in tank cars gives rise to a question of law for the
courts, where based on a rule providing rates for articles in such
cars, and providing that carriers assume no obligation to furnish
the cars. 20 This decision, however, was reached by the courts
partly on the ground that the commission was given no power under the act to order a carrier to provide and furnish to shippers
tank cars for interstate shipments of goods. As such, an important question of law was involved as to whether or not the commission had jurisdiction to act in the matter.' 2
The Supreme Court frequently reiterates that an administrative question decided by the commission, when the commission
acted within its powers and not subject to any mistake in law,
will not be reviewed by the courts. Thus the findings by the
commission that spur tracks within switching limits in a city were
part of the carrier's terminals and that the receipt and delivery
on these tracks of carload freights in interstate commerce were a
like service as compared with such receipts and delivery at team
tracks and freight sheds within such switching limits, are con(1913) 232 U. S. 423, 34 Sup. Ct. 125, 58 L. Ed. 296; United States v.
Louisville & N. R. Co., (1914) 235 U. S. 314, 35 Sup. Ct. 113, 59 L Ed.
245; Manufacturers R. Co. .v. United States, (1918) 246 U. S. 457, 38
Sup. Ct.
383, 62 L. Ed. 831.
i"7 Finkbine Lumber Co. v. Gulf & S. I. R. Co., (C.C.A. 5th Cir.
1920) 269 Fed. 933.
""Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Lambert R. Co., (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1920)
267 Fed. 776, certiorari denied, Lambert R. Co. v. Baltimore & G. R. Co.,
(1920) 9 254 U. S. 651, 41 Sup. Ct. 148, 65 L. Ed. 458.
11 United States v. Duluth S. S. & R. R. Co., (D.C. Mich. 1921) 281
Fed. 347.
20 United States v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (1916) 242 U. S. 208, 37
Sup. Ct. 95, 61 L. Ed. 251.
12'Ibid.
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clusive on the courts.

22

Likewise, an order by the commission

concerning the absorption of switching charges is conclusive.12
A finding by the commission that a refusal of trunk line railways to absorb the charges of a terminal company was not unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory will not be reviewed by the
court, where based on evidence and within the authority of the
commission.124 Also a finding that a tap railroad of a proprietary company is a mere plant facility, is reviewable only on allegation that it is not supported by any substantial evidence or that
it is arbitrary. But arbitrary action in such a case can be predicated only on a disregard by the commission of the very &iteria
which it adopts to determine the ultimate question of fact or on
the adoption in different cases of distinctions without real dif125

ferences.

Orders of the commission regulating railroad accounting are
conclusive and will not be set aside by the courts unless they
unlawfully interfere with property rights. 2 '
What is an undue or unreasonable preference or advantage,
forbidden by the interstate commerce act' 21 is a question not of
law but of fact for the commission to determine. If the order
does not contravene any constitutional limitation, and is within
the constitutional and statutory authority of the commission, and
supported by testimony, it cannot be set aside by the courts, as it
is only the exercise of an authority which the laws vests in the
commission.128 Even if there is no dispute as to facts in such
cases the courts cannot substitute their judgment as to the existence of a preference by carriers for that of the commission. 29
122J. C. C. v. Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co., (1914) 234 U. S. -294, 34
Sup. Ct. 814, 58 L. Ed. 1319; I. C. C. v. Southern P. Co., (1914) 234
U. S. 315, 34 Sup. Ct. 820, 58 L. Ed. 1329. See also Louisville & N. R.
Co. v.23United States (1916) 242 U. S. 60, 37 Sup. Ct. 61, 61 L. Ed. 152.

1 Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, (1920) 254 U. S. 57,

41 Sup.
Ct. 24, 65 L. Ed. 129.
124Manufacturers' R. Co. v. United States, (1918) 246 U. S. 457, 38

Sup. 25
Ct. 383, 62 L. Ed. 831.

1 United States v. Louisiana & P. R. Co., (1914) 234 U. S. 1, 34
Sup. Ct. 741, 58 L. Ed. 1185.
126 Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. United States, (1913) 231 U. S.
423, 34 Sup. Ct. 125, 58 L. Ed. 296.
12724 Stat. at L. 380, sec. 3.
28 Pennsylvania Co. v. United States, (1915) 236 U. S. 351, 35 Sup. Ct.
370, 59 L. Ed. 616; United States v. Louisville & N. R. Co., (1914) 235
U. S. 314, 35 Sup. Ct. 113, 59 L. Ed. 245; Manufacturers R. Co. v.
United States, (1918) 246 U. S. 457, 38 Sup. Ct. 383, 62 L. Ed. 831.
129 United States v. Louisville & N. R. Co., (1914) 235 U. S. 314, 35
Sup. Ct. 113, 59 L. Ed. 245.
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As previously stated in this article, findings of fact of the
commission in connection with unlawful discrimination are conclusive, and can be reviewed only where its action is arbitrary or
transcends the legitimate bounds of its authority. 30 Such findings
of the commission are not conclusive, however, if they are founded on a mistaken basis and the error of the commission in choos3
ing a wrong basis is material.' '
Furthermore, the question whether the discrimination by a
carrier, found to exist, can be held in law to be attributable to
the parties to the order, can be reviewed. 3 2 On this point the
Supreme Court said:
"As to administrative orders operating in future, the commission's findings of fact are conclusive, subject to qualifications here
not pertinent; and a finding that the discrimination is unjust is
ordinarly a finding of fact. . .. '
But the question presented
here is whether the discrimination found can be held in law to be
attributable to the appellants, and whether they can be required
to cancel existing joint rates, unless it is removed. No finding
by
134
the commission can prevent the review of such questions."
IX.

LIMITATIONS AND PREREQUISITES TO THE FINALITY OF THE
DECISIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COM.MERCE COMMISSION

(a) In. General.-As we have already seen there are certain
marked limitations to the conclusiveness of the findings made by
the interstate commerce commission. These limitations have been
summed up by the courts substantially as follows: First, the
statute or acts conferring power upon the commission must be
valid. Second, the commission must act within its statutory and
constitutional authority. As such, it must keep within the powers
conferred upon it by the interstate commerce act. Third, whether
as a part of this or not, there must be due process of law. A
rate order, for instance, is not final if the rate is so low as to be
'5 0 Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, (19-0) 254 U. S. 57,
41 Sup. Ct. 24, 65 L. Ed. 129; I. C. C. v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co.,
(1911) 220 U. S.235, 31 S. C. R. 392, 55 L. Ed. 448; Manufacturers R. Co.
v. United States, (1918) 246 U. S.456, 38 Sup. Ct. 383, 62 L. Ed. 831;
Nashville, C. & St. L R. v. Tennessee, (1923) 262 U. S. 318, 43 Sup.
Ct. 583,
67 L. Ed. 999.
131Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Jacoby & Co., (1916) 242 U. S.89, 37 Sup.
Ct. 49,
61 L. Ed. 165. See text and footnote 97, supra.
.32Central R. Co. of N. 3. v. United States, (1921) 257 U. S.247,
42 Sup.
Ct. 66 L. Ed. 217.
23 sManufacturers R. Co. v. United States, (1918) 246 U. S. 457, 38
Sup. 34
Ct. 383, 62 L. Ed. 831.
' Central R. Co. of N. ..v. United States, (1921) 257 U. S. 247, 42
Sup. Ct 80, 66 L. Ed. 217.
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confiscatory, or if it amounts to a taking of property without
due process of law. Fourth, findings and orders of the conimission are reviewable if the commission exercised its powers in an
arbitrary, unjust, or unreasonable manner. Fifth, whether as a
part of the limitations mentioned or not, we note that an order
is not conclusive if there was no hearing in cases where a
hearing is required. Sixth, findings and orders are not final if
contrary to evidence or if not based on evidence. Seventh, the
decisions of the commission are generally reviewable on questions
of law.135
The seven limitations just mentioned, however, can be included in the following four: First, the acts conferring power upon
the commission must be valid. Second, the commission must act
within the authority of the statutes. If the act is valid and the
commission confines itself to the limitations of the act, it is to
be expected that the action of the commission is neither arbitrary,
unjust, nor unreasonable, nor should such an act transgress the
provisions of the constitution. However, if there is any further
limitation necessary along this line, it will be included in the
following; namely, a third limitation that there must be due process of law, including an opportunity for hearing wherever required by law, and a decision based upon evidence. Fourth, questions of law as a rule are reviewable.
(b) . Constitutional Validity of the Interstate Commerce Act.When points have been raised regarding the constitutional validity
of the interstate commerce act, such questions have almost invariably been decided in favor of the validity of the provisions of the
statute."' In a number of cases, however, the Supreme Court
has rendered decisions which have seriously curbed the powers
of the commission, 3 ' and in Counselnan v. Hitchcock,13 the
135Manufacturers R. Co. v. United States, (1918) 246 U. S. 457, 38
Sup. Ct. 383, 62 L. Ed. 831; I. C. C. v. Union P. R. Co., (1912) 222
U. S. 541, 32 Sup. Ct. 108, 56 L. Ed. 308.
1361. C. C. v. Illinois, (1910) 215 U. S. 452, 30 Sup. Ct. 155, 54 L. Ed.
280; Intermountain Rate Cases (United States v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.
Co.), (1914) 234 U. S. 476, 34 Sup. Ct. 986, 58 L. Ed. 1408; Baltimore
& 0. R. v. I. C. C., (1911) 221 U. S. 612, 31 Sup. Ct. 621, 55 L. Ed.
878; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. v. United States, (1917) 244 U. S. 336, 37
Sup. Ct. 635, 61 L. Ed. 1175; I. C. C. v. Goodrich Transit Co., (1912)
224 U. S. 194, 32 Sup. Ct. 436, 56 L. Ed. 729; Pipe Line Cases (United
States v. Ohio Oil Co.), (1914) 234 U. S. 548, 34 Sup. Ct. 956, 58 L. Ed.
1459; O'Keefe v. United States, (1916) 240 U. S. 294, 36 Sup. Ct. 313, 60 L.
Ed. 651.
137 Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R. v. I. C. C., (1896) 162 U. S. 184,
16 Sup. Ct. 700, 40 L. Ed. 935; I. C. C. v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R.,
(1897) 167 U. S. 479, 17 Sup. Ct. 896, 42 L. Ed. 243; Kentucky & Ind.
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Supreme Court held invalid a part of the interstate commerce act
pertaining to compulsory testimony. The amendment of 1889
made it a penal or criminal offense for carriers, shippers, or other
agents to participate in personal discriminations, payment of rebates, etc. In 1890 a shipper declined to answer to a question
relating to his enjoyment of a preferential rate on the ground that
the fifth amendment to the constitution provided that no persorn
should be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. The Supreme Court held that the revised statutes of
the United States13 did not give adequate protection to witnesses.
Following this decision, Congress passed a law"10 providing
"that no person shall be excused from attending and testifying . . . before the interstate commerce commission or in obedi-

ence to the subpoena of the commission." But, according to the
act, no person should be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty
or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing,
concerning which he might testify, or produce evidence before the
provision was upheld in 1896 in
commission. The validity of this
14
the case of Brown v. Walker. 1
(c) Commission inust act within the Limits of the Authority
Conferred upon it.-It is an elementary principle of law that
the interstate commerce commission, in order that its action shall
be valid, must act within the statutory authority conferred upon
it. Also in order that an order of the commission shall be conelusive it is necessary that the commission shall not have acted
in such an arbitrary way as to deprive a party of his legal or
constitutional rights,1 42 or in such a way as to amount to an
Bridge Co., v. Louisville & N. R. Co., (C.C. Ky. 1889) 37 Fed. 567;
I. C. C. v. Northern P. R. Co., (1910) 216 U. S. 538, 30 Sup. Ct. 417,
54 L. Ed. 608 and cases there cited.
13s(1892) 142 U. S. 547, 12 Sup. Ct. 195, 35 L. Ed. 1110.
3z9Section 860 of the revised statutes provided that witnesses should
not be excused from testifying because their testimony might tend to
incriminate them, but it provided that such testimony should not be used
against them in any criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court held that
this was not sufficient protection to the witness.
40OAct of February 11, 1893, 27 Stat. at L. 443.
141(1896) 161 U. S. 591, 16 Sup. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819.
42

-Manufacturers R. Co. v. United States, (1918) 246 U. S. 457, 38
Sup. Ct. 383, 62 :L. Ed. 831; Seaboard Air Line IL Co. v. United States,
(1920) 254 U. S. 57, 41 Sup. Ct. 24, 65 L. Ed. 129; Lehigh Valley R_
Co. v. United States, (1917) 243 U. S. 412, 37 Sup. Ct. 397, 61 L. Ed.
819; United States v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., (1914) 234 U. S.476.
34 Sup. Ct 986, 58 L. Ed. 1408; 'United States v. Union P. R. Co., (1914)
234 U. S.495, 34 Sup. Ct. 995, 58 L. Ed. 1426; United States v. Louisiana
& P. R. Co., (1914) 234 U. S.1, 34 Sup. Ct. 741, 58 L Ed. 1185; Florida
E. C. R. Co. v. United States, (1914) 234 U. S. 167, 34 Sup. Ct. 867,
58 L. Ed. 1267; Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States, (1912) 225 U. S.
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abuse of discretion.143 This is referred to by the Supreme Court
in several cases, either as dicta or as a part of the decision in
the case. 144 Where the commission has exceeded its statutory
authority and as a result its actions are void, the order of the
commission is not only inconclusive but in such a case the courts
have jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of an order even if
the plaintiff has not attempted to secure redress in a proceeding
before the commission. 1 4' But an appeal will not lie to the courts
to review an act of the commission in refusing to entertain a petition upon the ground that the subject matter was not within the
scope of its powers.

146

Closely connected with the matter of arbitrary action is the
fact that matters of constitutional rights are frequently not to
be conclusively determined by the commission, and a party is apparently not debarred from attacking an order of the commission
upon constitutional grounds even though they were not taken in
the hearing before that body. 47 The courts do not attempt to
282, 32 Sup. Ct. 761, 56 L. Ed. 1091; United States v. New River Co.,
(1924) 265 U. S. 533, 44 Sup. Ct. 610, 68 L. Ed. 1165; Kansas City So.
R. Co. v. United States, (1913) 231 U. S. 423, 34 Sup. Ct. 125, 58 L. Ed.
296.
' 43United States v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., (1912) 225 U. S. 306,
32 Sup. Ct. 817, 56 L. Ed. 1101; 1. C. C. v. Diffenbaugh, (1911) 222
U. S.4442, 32 Sup. Ct. 22, 56 L. Ed. 83.
1 Pennsylvania Co. v. United States, (1915) 236 U. S. 351, 35 Sup. Ct.
370, 59 L. Ed. 616; Hooker v. Knapp, (1912) 225 U. S. 302, 32 Sup. Ct.
769, 56 L. Ed..1099; Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States, (1912) 225
U. S. 282, 32 Sup. Ct. 761, 56 L. Ed. 1091; United States v. Atchison, T.

& S. F. R. Co., (1914) 234 U. S. 476, 34 Sup. Ct. 986, 58 ,L. Ed. 1408;
United States v. Union P. R. Co., (1914) 234 U. S. 495, 34 Sup. Ct. 995,

58 L. Ed. 1426; Skinner, Eddy Corporation v. United States, (1919) 249
U. S. 557, 39 Sup. Ct. 375, 63 L. Ed. 772; I. C. C. v. Diffenbaugh, (1911)
22 U. S. 42, 32 Sup. Ct. 22, 56 L. Ed. 83; United States v. New River Co.,
(1924) 265 U. S. 533, 44 Sup. Ct. 610, 68 L. Ed. 1165; Kansas City So.
R. Co. v. United States, (1913) 231 U. S. 423, 34 Sup. Ct. 125, 58 L. Ed.

296; Manufacturers R. Co. v. United States, (1918) 246 U. S. 457, 38
Sup. Ct. 383, 62 L. Ed. 831; 1. C. C. v. Illinois C. R. Co., (1910) 215
U. S. 452, 30 Sup. Ct. 155, 54 L. Ed. 280.
l4sSkinner, Eddy Corporation v. United States, (1919) 249 U. S. 557,
39 Sup. Ct. 375, 63 L. Ed. 772; I. C. C. v. Diffenbaugh, (1911) 222 U. S.
42, 32 Sup. Ct. 22, 56 L. Ed. 83; Louisiana & P. R. Co. v. United States,
(Com. Court 1913) 209 Fed. 244; Atlantic Coast L. R. Co. v. I. C. C.,

(Com. Court 1911) 194 Fed. 449. Compare these cases with the follow-

ing: I. C. C. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., (1913) 227 U. S. 88, 33 Sup.
Ct. 185, 57 -L. Ed. 431; Southern Pacific Co. v. I. C. C., (1911) 219 U. S.

433, 31 Sup. Ct. 288, 55 L. Ed. 283.
1461.

C. C. v. United States, (1912)

556, 47
56 L. Ed. 849.

234 U. S. 474, 32 Sup. Ct.

Manufacturers R. Co. v. United States, (1918) 246 U. S. 457, 38
Sup. Ct. 383. 62 L. Ed. 831; Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States,
(1912) 225 U. S. 282, 32 Sup. Ct. 761, 56 L. Ed. 1091; Hooker v. Knapp,

(1912) 225 U. S. 302, 32 Sup. Ct. 769, 56 L. Ed. 1099.
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define arbitrary action by the commission or just what they include by the term constitutional right, but the former is generally
connected 'with cases where the action was beyond the authority
of the commission, or was unsupported by evidence, or in some
way amounted to an abuse of discretion. The latter term, namely,
that of constitutional right, has to do especially with the fifth
taking of property
amendment to the constitution pertaining to the
148
without due process or without compensation.
Due Process of Law Requires a Hearing and a Decision
Based on Evidence.
(1) Hearing, and the Consideration of Evidence.
In the next place we note that with a few exceptions, ' the
findings and orders of the commission must be the result of a
hearing. 50 The provision for a hearing implies both the privilege
of introducing evidence and the duty of deciding in accordance
therewith. It is well established that an order of the commission
must be supported by evidence."'S To refuse to consider evi(d)

14SIbid.
34 9The transportation act of 1920, like the original act to regulate
commerce, and earlier amendments, distinguished, by the language used
and also in other respects, between those orders which can be made
only after hearing and those in which no hearing is required. Thus,
orders on applications for extension of line, for new construction, or for
abandonment under section 1, pars. 18-20, can be made only after hearing. But in the case of applications concerning the issue of securities
under section 20a par. 6, the commission may hold hearings "if it sees
fit." See Miller v. United States, (D.C. S.D. 1921) 277 Fed. 95; and
under the emergency provisions, section 1, pars. 15 and 16, and section
15, par. 4 an order may be issued without a hearing, but "terms" are
fixed after "subsequent hearings." Peoria & P. Union R Co. v. United
States, (1924) 263 U. S. 528, 44 Sup. Ct. 194, 68 L. Ed. 427.
i5OThe Chicago Junction Case (Baltimore & 0. R. Co.), (1924) 264
U. S. 258, 44 Sup. Ct. 317, 68 L. Ed. 667; Manufacturers R. Co. v.
United States, (1918) 246 U. S. 457, 38 Sup. Ct. 383, 62 L. Ed. 831;
Peoria & P. U. R. Co. v. United States, (1924) 263 U. S. 528, 44 Sup.
Ct. 194, 68 L, Ed. 427; L C. C. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., (1913) 227
U. S. 88, 33 Sup. Ct. 185, 57 L. Ed. 431; *Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. United
States, (1917) 243 U. S. 412, 37 Sup. Ct. 397; 61 L. Ed. 819.
151I. C. C. v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., (1902) 186 U. S. 320, 22 Sup.
Ct 824, 46 L. Ed. 1182; The Chicago Junction Case (Baltimore & 0. R.
Co.), (1924) 264 U. S. 258, 44 Sup. Ct. 317, 68 L. Ed. 667; Manufacturers
R_ Co. v. United States, (1918) 246 U. S. 457, 38 Sup. Ct. 383, 62 L. Ed.
.831; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. United States, (1917) 243 U. S. 412, 37
Sup. Ct. 397, 61 L. Ed. 819; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. United States.
(1916) 242 U. S. 60, 37 Sup. Ct. 61, 61 L, Ed. 152; Pennsylvania R. Co. v.
United States, (1915) 236 U. S. 351, 35 Sup. Ct. 370, 59 L. Ed. 616;
I. C. C. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., (1914) 234 U. S. _294. 34 Sup.
Ct. 814, 58 L. Ed. 1319; I. C. C. v. Southern P. Co., (1914) 234 U. S.
315, 34 Sup. Ct. 820, 58 L. Ed. 1329; United States v. Louisiana & P. R.
Co., (1914) 234 U. S. 1, 34 Sup. Ct. 741, 58 L. Ed. 1185; Florida E. C. R.
Co. v. United States (1914) 234 U. S. 167, 34 Sup. Ct. 867, 58 L. Ed.
1267; I. C. C. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., (1913) 227 U S. 88, 33 Sup.
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dence introduced or properly offered for introduction, or to
make an essential finding without supporting evidence is arbitrary action. If an order is not based on evidence it can be reviewed by the courts and the enforcement of the order can be
enjoined.15 2 Where it is contended that an order whose enforcement is resisted was rendered without evidence to support it,
and there is basis or apparent basis foe' such contention, the consideration of such a question involves not an issue of fact, but
one of law, which is for the courts to examine and decide.'
On the subject of hearing and evidence, the Supreme Court,
in reference to the interstate commerce act, has said:
"But the statute gave the right to a full hearing, and that conferred the privilege of introducing testimony, and at the same
time imposed the duty of deciding in accordance with the facts
proved. A finding without evidence is arbitrary and baseless .... ." As to the contention that the order of the commission
was conclusive even if the findings were not supported by evidence,
the court said: "If the government's contention is correct, it
would mean that the commission had a power possessed by no
other officer, administrative body, or tribunal under our government. It would mean that, where rights depended upon facts,
the commission could disregard all rules of evidence, and capriciously make findings by administrative fiat. Such authority, however beneficently exercised in one case. could be injuriously
exerted in another, is inconsistent with rational justice, and comes
under the constitution's condemnation of all arbitrary exercise
of power."' 54
Furthermore, lack of formal proof at the hearing essential
to sustain an order of the commission cannot be supplied by indulging a presumption that its findings were supported by the
information which the commission is required by the act to obtain
in order to enable it to perform the duties and carry out the objects for which it was created. 5 5 But an order based on conCt. 185, 57 L. Ed. 431; I. C. C. v. Union P. R. Co., (1912) 222 U. S. 541,
32 Sup. Ct. 108, 56 L. Ed. 308; M'Lean Lumber Co. v. United States,
(D.C. Tenn. 1917) 237 Fed. 460; Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Elliott, (C.C.A.
2nd Cir. 1919) 256 Fed. 18; Chestnut Ridge R. Co. v. United States,
(D.C. N.J. 1917) 248 Fed. 791; Village of Hubbard, Ohio v. United
States, (D.C. Ohio 1922) 278 Fed. 754.
'5-Florida E. C. R. Co. v. United States, (1914) 234 U. S. 167, 34
Sup. Ct. 867, 58 L. Ed. 1267: 154 I. C. C. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., (1913)
227 U. S. 88, 33 Sup. Ct. 185, 57 L. Ed. 431.
153Florida E. C. R. Co. v. United States, (1914) 234 U. S. 167, 34
Sup. Ct. 867, 58 L. Ed. 1267.
154I. C. C. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., (1913) 227 U. S. 88, 33 Sup.
Ct. 185, 57 L. Ed. 431.
155Ibid.
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flicting evidence cannot be said to have been made without any
evidence to support it;'16 and in determining whether or not there
was sufficient evidence to sustain an order of the commission,
the courts will not use that as an excuse to examine the facts.
That is, they will not examine the facts further than to determine
whether there was substantial evidence to support the order.""
As such, an order of the commission reducing rates cannot be
said to have been without substantial evidence to support it, where,
although there was no direct testimony that the old rate was unreasonably high, there were facts in evidence from which experts
could have named a rate.' 5 s Also, the courts will not support the
claim by one of the parties that an order of the commission was
not based on evidence where only a part of the evidence taken
before the commission is available for the consideration of the
court.'59
(2) Weight of Evidence.
The weight to be given to the evidence before the commission
is a question of fact for the commission to pass upon, and as
such is beyond the province of the courts to consider. 100 The
same thing is true regarding the wisdom of the order made by
the commission. 16 ' Thus even though the evidence in a case
would have warranted different findings by the commission and
its first order was contrary to its later order, this does not warrant a disturbance of the findings by the courts.102 If the courts
were to consider the record to decide whether too much weight
had been given by the commission to some parts of the evidence
and too little weight to other parts, it would assume to settle
1lo6bid.
157I. C. C. v. Union P. R. Co., (1912)
222 U. S. 541, 32 Sup. Ct. 108,
56 L. Ed. 308.
l58Ibid.
' 59 Louisiana & P. B. R. Co. v. United States, (1921) 257 U. S. 114,
42 Sup. Ct. 25, 66 L. Ed. 156; Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.,
(1920) 0 253 U. S. 117, 40 Sup. Ct. 466, 64 L. Ed. 810.
16Akron, C. & Y. R. Co. v. United States, (1923) 261 U. S. 184, 43
Sup. Ct. 270, 67 L. Ed. 605; Manufacturers R. Co. v. United States,
(1918) 246 U. S. 457, 38 Sup. Ct. 383, 62 L. Ed. 831; Louisville & N. R.
Co. v. United States, (1915) 238 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 696, 59 L. Ed. 1177;
I. C. C. v. Diffenbaugh, (1911) 222 U. S. 42, 42 Sup. Ct. 50, 56 L. Ed.
83; Illinois C. R. Co. v. I. C. C., (1907) 206 U. S. 441, 27 Sup. Ct. 700,
51 L. Ed. 1128; East Tenn., V. & G. R. Co. v. I. C. C., (1901) 181 U. S.
1, 21 Sup. Ct. 516, 45 L. Ed. 719.
161L. C. C. v. Illinois C. R. Co., (1910) 215 U. S. 452. 30 Sup. Ct.
155, 54 L. Ed. 280; Skinner, Eddy Corporation v. United States, (1919)
249 U. S. 557, 39 Sup. Ct. 375, 63 L. Ed. 772; Seaboard Air Line R. Co.
v. United States, (1920) 254 U. S. 57, 41 Sup. Ct. 24, 65 L. Ed. 129.
162Manufacturers R. Co. v. United States, (1918) 246 U. S. 457, 38
Sup. Ct. 383, 62 L. Ed. 831.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

questions that are, according to the cases, clearly questions of
fact and not of law, and the courts would be called upon as a
matter of original action to investigate numerous questions of
Furtherfact which the commission is best qualified to decide.'
necessarily
commission
the
before
evidence
of
the
more, the value
varies according to circumstances and hence it is necessary that
the value and weight of the evidence should be left with a body
that is experienced in the matters pertaining to the enforcement
of the interstate commerce act, and familiar with the complexities,
intricacies, and history of the problems in each section of the
country.'
(3)
Additional Evidence
Prior to the amendment of the interstate commerce act of
June, 1906, the courts held themselves open to the admission of
new and additional evidence when the case came before them, to
determine whether the commission's decision was correct.'"' But
since that date additional evidence cannot be admitted to determine
whether the commission reached the proper conclusions as to (iestions of fact.' 66 However, where a judgment against a carrier,
in a suit to enforce an award of damages by the commission for
discrimination, was reversed by the Supreme Court on the ground
of the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the award, and the
case has been remanded for a new trial, the court on the second
trial may properly admit additional evidence, including the testiniony of new witnesses. 6 ' This is partly, at least, on the ground
that the findings and order of the commission in reparation cases
constitute only prima facie evidence.
In a case where reparation is involved or where a party seeks
to enjoin the enforcement of an order of the commission and it
is contended that the commission based its order upon erroneous
percentages, figures, or mistaken theories, the courts will review
the findings of the commission to determine whether as a matter
But
of law the commission's findings of fact sustain the order.'
163 East Tenn., V. & G. R. Co. v. I. C. C., (1901)

181 U. S. 1, 21 Sup.

Ct. 516, 45 L. Ed. 719; Illinois C. R. Co. v. I. C. C., (1907) 206 U. S. 441,

Ct. 700, 51 L. Ed. 1128.
27 Sup.
' 6 4Louisville & N. R. Co. v. United States, (1915) 238 U. S. 1. 35
Sup. Ct. 696, 59 L. Ed. 1177; 1. C. C. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., (1913)

227 U. S. 88, 33 Sup. Ct. 185, 57 L. Ed. 431.

1 51. C. C. v. Alabama Midland R. Co., (1897) 164 U. S. 144, 18 Sup.
Ct. 45,66 42 L. Ed. 414.
' Manufacturers R. Co. v. United States, (1918) 246 U. S. 457, 38

Sup. 67
Ct. 383, 62 L. Ed. 831.

1 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Weber, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1920) 269 Fed. 111.
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an order of the commission will not be set aside or enjoined even
if based on improper percentages where there was no prejudicial
error because of the erroneous calculation by the commission."'
(e) Questions of Law.-Another limitation upon the
finality of the findings and orders of the commission is where
questions of law are involved. In such cases, the courts have a
right to enter. Although this limitation is frequently stated as
a separate one, it is generally tied up with the other limitations
already referred to or is the result of one or more of them. Thus
with respect to a finding of unreasonableness there is an error of
law, for instance, when there is no evidence to support the findings; and in case of discrimination there is error of law, for
example, when the act complained of is not attributable to the
,-rrier against which the order lies. 17 0 Also the questions ol
jurisdiction and the authority of the commission are questions
of law for the courts.,'
Likewise, a question whether the facts
found by the commission present a case of real or possible competition within the meaning of the statute is a question of law that
could not be conclusively answered by the commission.'"
X.

ORDERS

NEGATIVE,

LEGISLATIVE

AND

PERMISSIVE

Negative Orders-Generally speaking the courts have no
jurisdiction over negative orders of the commission. That is such
orders where the commission dismisses the complaint and refuses
to act further. As such, a shipper has no right to appeal to the
courts from the commission's ruling that a rate is reasonable
16SLouisville & N. R. Co. v. United States, (1915) 238 U. S. 1, 35 Sup.
Ct. 696, 59 L. Ed. 1177; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Jacoby & Co., (1916) 242
U. S. 89, 37 Sup. Ct. 49, 61 L. Ed. 165.
169Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Weber, (1921) 257 U. S. 85, 42 Sup.
Ct. 18, 66 L. Ed. 141; Kansas City S. R. Co. v. United States, (1913) 231
U. S. 423, 34 Sup. Ct. 125, 58 L. Ed. 296.
l°OLehigh Valley R. Co. v. United States, (1917) 243 U. S. 412,
37 Sup. Ct. 397; 61 L. Ed. 819; United States v. Pennsylvania R. Co..
(1916) 242 U. S. 208, 37 Sup. Ct. 95, 61 L. Ed. 251; Louisville & N. R.
Co. v. United States, (1916) 242 U. S. 60, 37 Sup. Ct. 61, 61 L. Ed. 152;
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. United States, (1915) 238 U. S. 1. 35 Sup.
Ct. 696, 59 L. Ed. 1177; United States v. Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co., (1914)
234 U. S. 476, 34 Sup. Ct. 986, 58 L. Ed. 1408; Florida E. C. R. Co. v. United States, (1914) 234 U. S. 167, 34 Sup. Ct. 867, 58 L. Ed. 1267: East
Tenn., V. & G. R. Co. v. I. C. C., (1901) 181 U. S. 1, 21 Sup. Ct. 516, 45
L. Ed. 719; M'Lean Lumber Co. v. United States, (D.C. Tenn. 1916) 237
Fed. 71
460.
1 United States v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (1916) 242 U. S. 208, 37
Sup. Ct. 95, 61 L. Ed. 251; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. United States,
(1916) 242 U. S. 60, 37 Sup. Ct. 61, 61 L. Ed. 152.
l72Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. United States, (1917) 243 U. S. 412, 37
Sup. Ct. 397, 61 L. Ed. 819.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

and from its dismissal of a complaint after due hearing. The
reason is that there is no authority in the courts as ,inoriginal
question, without affirmative action by the commission, to deal
with what is termed in a broad sense the administrative features
of the act by determining as an original question whether there
has been compliance or noncompliance with the provisions of the
act. 173 Taking jurisdiction in such cases would involve determination by the courts whether relief denied by the commission, in
the exercise of powers conferred upon it by statutes, should be
granted.
The mere fact, however, that the order of the commission dismisses a complaint does not necessarily prevent judicial review.
The case of the United States v. New River Co.17 illustrates this.
Here suit was brought to enjoin the carriers from applying rule
four of the commission,', pertaining to the distribution of coal
cars and to setting aside the decision and order of the commission.
dismissing the complaint of a shipper against the rule. Rule four,
promulgated during federal control of the railways, was continued
in effect upon the recommendation of the commission until it decided in 1921 that the rule was unduly prejudicial of local mines
and that the carriers should distribute cars to joint mines on the
basis of a 150 per cent rule. The commission refrained from
making an order that the 150 per cent rule should be filed as tariff
schedule, but announced that it expected the carriers promptly
to amend their car service rules to conform with its findings.
Accordingly, the carrier ceased to apply rule four and applied the
150 per cent rule in its place.
W,\hen the case was reopened before the commission, the contest was between the operators of local mines attacking the 150
per cent rule and the operators of joint mines s upporting that
rule and objecting to rule four. The commission reversed its former findings and decided in favor of rule four and dismissed
the complaints assailing that rule. The order expressly includes
the findings and conclusions stated in the report. When the case
1 3

7 Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States, (1912) 225 U. S. 282. 32
Sup. Ct. 761, 56 L. Ed. 1091; United States v. New River Co., (1924)
265 U. S.533, 44 Sup. Ct. 610, 68 L. Ed. 1165; Hooker v. Knapp, (1912)
225 U. S.302, 32 Sup. Ct. 769, 56 L. Ed. 1099; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v.
United States, (1917) 243 U. S. 412, 37 Sup. Ct. 397, 61 L. Ed. 819:
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. United States, (1915) 238 U. S.642, 35 Sup. Ct.
602, 59 L. Ed. 1502; I. C. C. v. United States, (1912) 234 U. S.474, 32
Sup. Ct. 556, 56 L. Ed. 849.
174(1924) 265 U. S.533, 44 Sup. Ct. 610, 68 L. Ed. 1165.
17 5Rule 4, Circular C s-31, revised.
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came before the court, it was held that in this case the order of
the commission was not merely negative, as the order authorized
the carriers to apply rule four in preference to the 150 per cent
rule; and if rule four was illegal, as alleged, there was nothing
to sustain the order of the commission, and suit would lie to set
6
it aside.
In some cases the courts refuse to review an order of the
commission not because of the fact that the order may be negative
in character, but because in place of having denied relief, the
commission has merely refused to grant the particular relief applied for. Thus in the cases of Proctor & Gamble v. United
States,"17 Hooker v. Kzapp, 78 and Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. United
States'-9 judicial review was refused, not because the order was
negative in character but because it was a denial of the affirmative
relief sought.lso
(b) Legislative and Permissive Orders.-In some cases it has
been contended that the judiciary has no power to review orders
of the commission which are legislative in character, but it is clear
that the legislative character alone does not preclude judicial
review.' 5 ' Rate orders are legislative in character but such orders
can be reviewed by the courts to determine whether they were unsupported by evidence, were made without hearing, exceeded
constitutional or statutory limits, or for some other reason were
the result of arbitrary or abusive action.
Nor does the fact that an, order is permissive preclude review,
when by that term is meant an order which, in contradistinction
to one compelling performance, authorizes a carrier to do some
act otherwise .prohibited.' s 2 Orders entered under the act of
June 18, 1910,213 amending section four of the interstate commerce act, are of this character. That section prohibits carriers
from charging more for a short than for a long distance over
the same line or route in the same direction without obtaining
authority from the commission. A suit will lie to set aside an
order granting such authority, and to enjoin action by the carrier
8 4
thereunder.
"16 See also United States v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., (1914) 234
U. S. 476, 34 Sup. Ct. 986, 58 L. Ed. 1408.
"7(1912) 225 U. S. 282, 32 Sup. Ct. 761, 56 L Ed. 1091.
178(1912) 225 U. S. 302, 32 Sup. Ct. 769, 56 L. Ed. 1099.
179(1917) 243 U. S. 412, 37 Sup. Ct. 397, 61 L. Ed. 819.
'8 0See also The Chicago Junction Case (Baltimore & 0. R. Co. V.
United States), (1924) 264 U. S. 258, 44 S. C. tR 317, 68 L. Ed. 667.
8'SIbid,.
at L
bid.
18336 Stat. at L. 539, 547.
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XI.

ORDERS DETERMINING

"FINAL

VALUE"

OF RAILROAD

PROPERTY

By an act of March 1, 1913,'-- and as later amended, 8i 0 the
interstate commerce commission was directed to appraise the
property of all common carriers subject to the Act to Regulate
Commerce. The act, now section 19a of the Interstate Commerce
Act, provides for both tentative and final reports on value by the
commission, both of which are called orders. A remedy is provided in case a carrier should claim the existence of material errors in the commission's tentative report. 87
The act further provides that the final valuations shall be
prima facie evidence of the value of the property in all proceedings under the act. When the final report is introduced in evidence, in a proceeding under the act, the opportunity to contest
the correctness of the findings therein made is fully preserved to
the carrier and errors may be ,corrected at the trial. Specific
findings may also be excluded because of errors committed in
making them. Furthermore, additional evidence may be introduced. Paragraph (j) of section 19a of the Interstate Commerce
Act provides that, "if upon the trial of any action involving a
final value fixed by the commission, evidence shall be introduced
regarding such value which is found by the court to be different
from that offered upon the hearing before the commission, or
additional thereto and substantially affecting said value," the proceedings shall be stayed so as to permit the commission to consider the same and fix a final value different from that fixed in
the first instance, and to "alter, modify, amend or rescind any
order which is made involving such final value . . ."
IS*Skinner, Eddy Corporation v. United States, (1919) 249 U. S.
557, 39 Sup. Ct. 375, 63 L. Ed. 772; United States v. Merchants & M. T.

Ass'n, (1916) 242 U. S. 178, 37 Sup. Ct. 24, 61 L. Ed. 233.

18537 Stat. at L. 701.
186By acts of Feb. 28, 1920, 41 Stat. at L. 456, 474, 493; and of June

7, 1922, 42 Stat. at L. 624. See section 19a of the Interstate Commerce
Act. 87
, Paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of Section 19a of the act Irovide
for and regulate the submission of tentative reports. When tentative
reports are submitted, the carrier is authorized to file a protest and to
be heard thereon. If such protest is filed, the commission is directed to
make such changes in the report, if any, as it may deem proper. Even
if no protest is filed, the commission may of its own motion upon due
notice to parties in interest correct the tentative report. Compare New
York, Ontario & Western Ry. Co. v. United States, (1927) 47 Sup. Ct.
334. See also United States v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co., (1927) 47
Sup. Ct. 413.
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Although these remedies are available to the carrier who is
dissatisfied with a valuation order of the commission, the valuation orders themselves are not judicially reviewable; at any rate
not to the extent that they will be annulled, enjoined, or declared
invalid by the courts. There are several reasons why the courts
will not or cannot sit in judgment upon valuation orders, but
the outstanding reason seems to be that such orders are not determinations of rights, and that in place of being final orders they
are estimates of value for use in subsequent proceedings. As
such, the valuation orders are unlike the ones that are judicially
reviewable.
In collecting its data and in making valuation orders, the commission did not act as a quasi judicial body determining controversies, or as a legislative agency fixing rates or laying down
rules for the future. It simply acted as an administrative "tribunal appointed by law and informed by experience" in making
preliminary investigations and reports; some of which might
never have any material significance in any proceedings before
the commission or a court. Furthermore, Congress has not even
attempted to confer upon the courts power to supervise these
administrative findings of the commission nor to substitute its
judgment for that of the commission regarding the true value of
railroad property. s
In distinguishing such orders from those reviewable, the
Supreme Court of the United States said:
"The so-called order here complained of is one which does
not command the carrier to do, or to refrain from doing anything
which does not grant or withhold any authority, privilege or license; which does not extend or abridge any power or facility;
which does not subject the carrier to any liability, civil or criminal;
which does not change the carrier's existing or future status or
condition; which does not determine any right or obligation. This
so-called order is merely the formal record of conclusions reached
after a study of data collected in the course of extensive research
conducted by the commission, through its employees.
It is the
8 9
exercise solely of the function of investigation."' r
XII.

NECESSITY OF FINAL ACTION BY THE Co!mIssIoN BEFORE
THE COURTS CAN

ACT

In order that a finding or decision by the commission can be
reviewed, it is of course necessary that there has been final action
'ssUnited States v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co., (1927)

'89Ibid.

47 Sup. Ct. 413.
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in the proceedings by the administrative tribunal. As such the
jurisdiction of the courts does not extend to a suit to set aside
an order of the commission fixing a future day and place for a
hearing. 1' ° Concerning such an order the Supreme Court said
that it was nothing more than notice of a hearing and hence had
no characteristic of an order as referred to in the interstate commerce act, either affirmative or negative.19 '
But this does not mean that all administrative remedies must
be exhausted before judicial review can be invoked. In United
States v. Abilene & S. Ry. Co.,1 9 2 an investigation and order relating to decisions of joint rates had been made, not by the whole
commission but by one of its divisions. The statute provides " '
that the order of a division has the same force and effect as if
made by the commission, subject to rehearing by the commission,
and any party may apply for such rehearing of any order or matter so determined.1 9 4 Meanwhile, the order may be suspended
either by the division or by the commission. In the case in question the order, by its terms was not to become effective until thirtyseven days after its entry, so there was ample time within which
to apply for a rehearing and a stay, before plaintiffs could have
been injured by the order. The question before the Supreme
Court was whether the district court had jurisdiction in a suit to
enjoin enforcement of the order made by the division before there
had been filed a petition for rehearing before the full commission.
The objections to the validity of the order urged were in part
procedural. They included questions of joinder of parties, or the
admissibility of evidence. and of failure to introduce formal evidence. In deciding the question of jurisdiction of the district
court the Supreme Court noted that most of these objections did
not appear to have been raised before the division and that if they
had been alleged, errors might have been corrected by action of
that body or by the full commission. The order also involved
questions of administrative power and policy, which, apparently
had never been passed upon by the full commission and were not
discussed by the plaintiffs before the division. The Supreme
19
oUnited States v. Illinois Central R. Co., (1917) 244 U. S. 82, 37
Sup. Ct. 584, 61 L. Ed. 1007; see also Detroit & T. S. L. R. Co. v. I. C. C.,
(D.C. App. 1921) 277 Fed. 535.
'91Ibid.
192(1924) 265 U. S. 274, 44'Sup. Ct. 565, 68 L. Ed. 1016.
193 Interstate commerce act as amended, sec. 17(4), being U. S. Comp.
Stat. 9Ann. Supp., 1923, sec. 8586.
1 4Section 16a (U. S. Comp. Stat. sec. 8585).
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Court held that in view of these facts the trial court would have
been justified in denying equitable relief until an application had
been made to the full commission, and redress had been denied by
it. But, since in the absence of a stay, the order of the division
was operative, and the filing of an application for a rehearing
would not have relieved the carrier from the duty of observing the
order, the district court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit,
despite the failure to apply for a rehearing. The court further
stated that whether judicial relief should have been denied until
all possible administrative remedies had been exhausted was a
matter which called for the exercise of the judicial discretion of
the district court and that the Supreme Court could not say that
in denying the motion to dismiss, the discretion was abused."'
It is also noteworthy that in proceedings before the courts
under the act to enforce an order of the commission, the courts
have no power to amend or modify such order, or to sever from
the remainder a part which is illegal. On the other hand they
must enforce the order if at all, in its entirety as made by the
commission. 190
CONCLUSIOMN

An outstanding test regarding the conclusiveness of administrative decisions is the adequacy of the process provided within
the administrative tribunal. If there is adequate opportunity
for notice and hearing, with an opportunity to summon witnesses,
to present evidence, and to inspect or cross-examine the evidence
of the opponent; if, in addition, there is a tribunal competent to
pass upon the validity and weight of the evidence and to render
a.decision that comports with the rights and interests involved, a
person will generally not be heard to complain on the ground that
the process was administrative rather than judicial.
Where adequate administrative process exists, congestion in
courts, because of judicial review of administrative decisions, is
not only materially lessened but such review is also simplified
where still preserved. Where such adequate process exists, judicial review is largely limited to a determination as to whether the
advantages of the administrative process established by law have
' 9 5 See also Prendergast v. New York T. Co., (1923) 262 U. S. 43,
43 Sup. Ct. 467, 67 L. Ed. 853. Compare with Chicago R. Co. v. Illinois
C. C. (D.C. Il. 1922) 277 Fed. 970.
19GI. C. C. v. Lakeshore & M. C. R. Co., (C.C. Ohio 1905) 134 Fed.
942, affirmed without opinion by a divided court (1906) 202 U. S. 613,
26 Sup. Ct. 766, 50 L. Ed. 1171.
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been allowed. If allowed, the duty of the court is ordinarily at
an end. If not allowed, the case is generally remanded to the
administrative tribunal for further proceedings. This relieves
the courts from trying the case de novo.
Closely connected with adequacy of process is the need of a
complete record of the proceedings so that the parties in interest,
and others, may examine the evidence, the issues involved, the
findings and conclusions, the decision and its supporting reasons,
with sonie degree of facility. To accomplish this satisfactorily,
it is generally necessary for the administrative tribunals to make
memoranda or reports of their decisions that bear some resemblance, in form at least, to those of the federal or other superior
courts.
In the federal government the interstate commerce commission is the outstanding administrative agency that deserves special credit regarding adequacy of process and adequate records
and reports. The process before the commission and the competence of the tribunal is such that a party in interest generally
has an opportunity there to defend, protect, or enforce his rights.
As such, it is comparatively seldom that it is necessary for him to
spend his time, money, and energy in procuring judicial review.
Regarding complete records and reports, the interstate commerce commission renders, records, and publishes its opinions in
such a way that one, with reasonable ease, can ascertain the important facts, the issues involved, the decisions of the commission and the supporting reasons.
The interstate commerce commission has been in existence for
forty years. During the latter half of this period, or since the
passing of the act of 1906, which among other things gave the
commission power to fix maximum rates, there has been a tendency on the part of the courts to consider this agency as a competent and to a large extent independent "tribunal appointed by
law and informed by experience", and as such amply qualified to
deal with intricate problems that require skill along specialized
lines. As a partial result of this, the Supreme Court, in combining
questions of fact with questions of discretion, has characterized a
number of questions as administrative in nature, upon which it
refuses to substitute its judgment for that of the commission, and
into which it will not inquire until the commission has made its
ruling. 1 97

This is apparent chiefly in non-reparation cases and

regarding preliminary questions in reparation cases.
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Because of the adequate process, the competence of the tribunal, and the complete records and reports, a uniform system of
rules and decisions has been established by the commission, which
rules and decisions stand as precedents, primarily for the commission, but also for the courts, particularly insofar as administrative questions are involved. The decisions or opinions of the interstate commerce commission are valuable both from the standpoint of substantive and procedural law, and a person or concern
affected or about to be affected by its decisions has a fair chance to
know his substantive rights and to what process he is entitled,
as well as a reasonable basis upon which to predict the outcome
of his case. It is submitted that several of the administrative
agencies of our state and federal governments might improve by
becoming familiar with the work of this administrative tribunal.
197 See footnote 100, supra.

